As the E uropea n Union (E .o.) marks its 50th anniversa ry, its effo rts to create a single European free m arket continu e to face a number of o bstacles. A key business poli cy concern among E. o. m ember states and corporati ons is the E .o. policy directi ve that aims to £lCilitate corpo rate takeovers in the interest of E uro p ean corpora te effi ciency in the glo bal m arket place. As the E uropean Unio n stru ggles to establish economic regulato ry command through m easures such as its directive on takeover bids, m ember nati ons and corporatio ns com e under pressure to adhere to E. U . prescribed E u ropean practices rather than following o nl y their own p erceived nati o nal and corpo rate self-interest. Germ any, in particular, provides a special challenge to E. 0. oversight as the result of an o ngoing debate o n internatio nal corporate governance policies . A number of Germ an laws and business practices conflict with E. U . poli cies. German corporatio ns rely o n concentrated corporate ownership and control to protect corpo rate stability. Alterati o ns to Germ an policies and corpo rate governance stru ctu res that protect German corporate ownership are a threat to Germany's control over its industries, o pening the door to hostile takeovers of German corporatio ns. Such policy alterati ons, ad vocated by the E.o. , test the resilien cy of the E. U. and Germany's con111utment to the E. U .
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Germany's stro ngest and m ost protected industry, the auto m obile industr y, provides the best example of the challenges that face the German co rpo ra te system under E .U. governance. T h e current debate over Porsche's bid to control Volkswagen has op ened a " Pando ra 's box of governance issues." I German state and corpo rate p olicies have lo ng been geared toward protecting the G erman autom obile industry from perceived disruptive fo rces, parti cularly corporate takeovers that might result in fo reign ow nership o r m aj o r consolidatio ns of German corpo rati o ns w ith a loss of German j obs. This analysis explo res the issues facing th e German auto industry, and the matter of corporate takeovers in particular, while assessing the impac t of E. U . oversight o n the German auto industry and the
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German corporatist state. This assessment reveals inherent resistance by Germany and o ther E . U. m ember states toward E. U. policies that facilitate corporate takeovers and describes a number of corpo rate governance policies and government laws that continue to thwart takeovers in the German auto industry. Tlus resistance has, fo r the tin'le being, effectively derailed the current E.U . directive aimed at LlCilitating corporate takeovers.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GERMAN AUTO INDUSTRY
T he German autom o ti ve industry is the key industry in the G erman economy. " It is o f ernin ent significan ce fo r growth and prosperity of Germany as a business locatio n . It is indispensable . .. for guaranteeing a high level of incom e and fo r safeguarding a high ernploym ent volume." (Becker, 217 ) M ore than a third of all vehicle production in the E. U. is in Germany. T he G erman auto companies worldwide producti o n am o unts to 23% of total world passenger car producti on and the German car brands possess a 47% market share in Western E urope. Abo ut 20% of the annual German gross do m estic product in the last decade was earned by the auto industry The auto industry produ ced a German foreign trade surplus in cars of 79 billion euros in 2004, which am ounts to 80% of the entire German trade surplus. The industry directl y employs approxim ately 770,000 Germans, with an estimated 1.5 million m o re employed in the multitude of industries and services upstream and downstream from autom otive production (e.g. m echalucal engineering, chenucals, etc.), no t counting those in car sales and trades such as repair and service, etc, which add another 3 millio n jobs. It is estimated that o ne in seven German j obs depend on the auto industry. T he German auto industry, understandabl y, has been referred to as the " engine of the German Econom y." (B ecker, 21 8-19) 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE-STATE RELATIONS IN THE GERMAN AUTO INDUSTRY
Germany is a federal state m ade up of different states o r "lands." Many aspects of social and econonuc life are decentralized in Germany and are the respo nsibility of these state governments. The m aj o r German automotive corporati ons are Volkswagen, BMW, DaimlerC hrysler, Porsche, O pel, and Ford Werke. Each m anufacturer has its headquarters in a ditIerent state, with the exception of Porsche and D aimlerC hrysler, which share Stuttgart in the state of Baden-Wtirttemberg as the site of their headquarters. The autom otive companies that m ake up the German automotive industry have strong regional ties to the German states in w hich they were established and in which they maintain their headquarters. Each of the German car companies, therefo re, must deal with its own regio nal government, as well as the natio nal German government. Because of these strong regional ties, each company can rely o n its own state govermnent to help represent its interests at the natio nal level as w ell . (Dankbaa r, 2) The econonues of these states are centered on their m ain indu stry, with each of these automakers typically being thc m aj or cmploycr, dircctly and indirectly, in their respective regions. This is particularly true for Volkswagen, which transformed Wolfsburg in the state of Lower Saxony into o ne of the largest auto productio n sites in the world Volkswage n is the only major employer in the region (Dankbaar, 1) , which m akes the workforce in the state of Lower Saxony highly dependent on the company.
As in other German industries, the close associatio n of each German automobile m anufacturer with its hom e state som etimes includes state ownership in the company, altho ugh m ost often this is not the case. Substantial state ownerslup occurs in abo ut 10% of German companies througho ut all sectors, as compared to 25% of French firms and 1 % of 34
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As in other German industries, the close associatio n of each German automobile m anufacturer with its hom e state som etimes includes state ownership in the company, altho ugh m ost often this is not the case. Substantial state ownerslup occurs in abo ut 10% of German companies througho ut all sectors, as compared to 25% of French firms and 1 % of http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/5 u.K. firms, as of 1993. (Whittington and M ayer, 104) State ownership of firms in Germany, w h en it occurs, is also m ore plural. "Reflecting Germany's federal nature, state share holdings are found at va rious levels-federal, regional, ... and even municipal .... Among the regional states, the most notable participatio n is probably Lower Saxony's in VW ... at abo ut 20%" (Whittington and Mayer, Even w hen there is no direct state ownership in a particular company, the German government and the regional state governments in which manufacturers are based take a corporatist, protective attitude toward the politically powelful and irnportant German automobile companies.
The history of each of the m aj o r German autolllobile manufacturers, their relationship to their regio nal states, as well as their place within the German auto industry as a whole, provide case exa mples of the blending of corporate-state interests and of the challenges facing the German auto industry and Germ an economy as a whole. This analysis will fo cus on Volkswagen, Porsch e and DaimlerChrysler in particular.
VOLKSWAGEN
T he Gennan government fo unded Volkswagen (VW) as a state owned company in 1937. Volkswagen (meaning " people's car") was found ed with a social agenda. The o riginal purpose of the company was to increase employment by employ ing the vast number of workers needed to produce an affordable car on a grand scale. Ferdinand Porsche designed the o riginal Volkswagen car, the famo us Beetle, at Adolf Hitler's request. The Beetle was designed to become the German M odel T. At that time, an ave rage American worker could afford a car, thanks to the economies of scale introdu ced by Ford and General M otors. In contrast, the average German worker in 1937 could not afio rd a car. VW has continu ed to follow the business model of a volume, mass-market producer, but has evolved from a single product company (the Beetle) to a volume manufacturer that offers a broad range of products covering wide sections of the market. In the 1980s and 1990s, VW shifted further in the direction of increasing the scope (product range) of its production through the acquisition of the Spanish company, SEAT, and the Czech company, Skoda.VW has further expanded into the prem.ium car m arket, primarily through its Audi subsidiary, but also with the acquisition of ultra luxury nameplates such as Bentley and Bugatti. (Dankbaar, 1) VW is, therefore, increasingly trying to satisfy all things automotive to all segm ents of the m arket.
Volkswagen was priva tized in the early 1960s. T he descendents of Ferdinand Porsche, indud.ing his grandson Ferd.inand Piech, own shares in Volkswagen, as well having control of Porsche through its supervisory board. (Brecht and M aye r, 30; Dankbaar, 2) VW and Po rsche have had many links thro ugho ut the history of the two companies. Ferdinand Piech was the chief executive ofVW from 1993 until 2002.Wh en VW was priva tized in the 1960s, the German government passed a law aimed at recognizing and perpetuating the social importance ofVulkswagen to its native state of Lower Saxony by establishing an institutio nal corpo rate safety valve to prevent a foreign or hostile takeover that might otherwise result in the loss of thousands of jobs in W olfsburg. This law allowed Lower Saxony to own a controlling 20% stake in the company and prevented other share holders from acquiring m ore than this 20% stake of voting shares . TIllS 1960 law (known as the "Volkswagen law") preserved a state interest in VW that effectively prevented a hostile takeove r, until Ferdinand Piech launched a bid by Porsch e to take a controlling interest in VW in September 2005. T his takeover bid created a protracted power struggle w ith Porsche acting in apparent defi ance of the VW law. The Po rsche takeover ofVW has just recently come to fruition , as (Whittington and Mayer, Even w hen there is no direct state ownership in a particular company, the German government and the regional state governments in which manufacturers are based take a corporatist, protective attitude toward the politically powelful and irnportant German automobile companies. The history of each of the m aj o r German autolllobile manufacturers, their relationship to their regio nal states, as well as their place within the German auto industry as a whole, provide case exa mples of the blending of corporate-state interests and of the challenges facing the German auto industry and Germ an economy as a whole. This analysis will fo cus on Volkswagen, Porsch e and DaimlerChrysler in particular.
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The Impact of EU Oversight on Corporate Governance in the German Auto Industry of M arch 2007, and hinged on the likelihood that the E .U. court would strike down the German Volkswagen law. The Porsche bid for VW highlighted the anti-takeover VW law. Tlus law had already become a fo cus of conflict between Germany and the E.U., since the law is in apparent conflict with the E. U. directive o n corporate takeovers.3 This and other conflicts between German automo bile industry interests and the E.U . w ill be discussed in greater detail below, aft er considering the situ ation of other German autom obile manufacturers as well , beginning with Porsche.
PORSCHE
Porsche is a niche automobile m anuEl cturer and is mu ch smaller than the other German car compalues. H oweve r, Porsche is highl y profitable. In fac t, Po rsche produ ces the highest profit margins o n its sales in th e entire glob al auto industry, even though all its cars are produced in Germany, with high German manufacturing costs. (Becker, 10) Fe rdinand Porsche founded the cornpany in the 1930s and all the voting shares in the company are still controlled by approximately 50 of his heirs (from the Porsche and Piech families). These fanuly m embers retai n to tal control of the company through a sign ed voting pact and corporate governance rules that all ow them control despite the fac t that their 100% ownership of Porsche's voting shares represents only abo ut 10% of the company's capital. It is estimated that the Porsche heirs together own an additional 10% of non-voting stock as well. (Brecht and M ayer, 30) T lus fanul y control of Po rsche precludes the possibility of hostile takeovers, w ith the Porsch e and Piech families firml y in control of the company's supervisory board and its destiny. Porsche's business plan, at least until recently, has b een to remain a niche player in the auto market; but it is not a sm all company. Porsche has approximately 8,000 employees and had total earnings in the year 2005-2006 of 2.1 1 billion Euros, despite sales of just 96,794 cars, wluch nevertheless represented a sales volume record . 4 Although Porsche is based in Stuttga rt, in the state of Baden-Wi.irttemburg, Porsche has lo ngstanding close ties to vw, which has particularly helped Porsche over the years .
Porsche used VW parts in its first cars. Most recently, Po rsche was able to develop its luxury SUV, the Cayenne, w ith o nly a m odest investment because of a partnership that it formed with VW to share the platfonn used for the VW To uareg. This agreem ent helped Porsche expand beyond its limited sports car line and reap high profits from a vehicle that it could not have profitably developed on its own. s Po rsche, therefore, h as much to gain by increasing its access to VW model platfo rms and electrorucs, which are costly to develop. The operant Porsche business plan of remaining a boutique auto m aker and out-sourcing much of its produ ct development and productio n has been exposed as unsustainable by of M arch 2007, and hinged on the likelihood that the E .U. court would strike down the German Volkswagen law. The Porsche bid for VW highlighted the anti-takeover VW law. Tlus law had already become a fo cus of conflict between Germany and the E.U., since the law is in apparent conflict with the E. U. directive o n corporate takeovers.3 This and other conflicts between German automo bile industry interests and the E.U . w ill be discussed in greater detail below, aft er considering the situ ation of other German autom obile manufacturers as well , beginning with Porsche.
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Po rsche managem ent's desire to forge closer ties with vw. end market as a specialist producer rather than a volume producer. More recently, however, BMW has hedged its bets with a limited expansion into the nuss-market segment with the Mini Cooper car and the lower end BMW 1 series. BMW has also pursued an extension of its high-end market into the ultra luxury field with the acquisition of the Rolls-Royce brand.
OPEL AND FORD WERKE
Opel and Ford Werke are Am erican owned subsidiaries of General Motors and Ford , respecti vely. T hese Gennan subsidiaries of the two big America n auto companies nevertheless hold a significa nt place in the German auto industry. Opel is headquartered in Frankfi.Irt in the regio n of H essen. Ford's European headquarters and production facilities are in Koln in Northrhine-Westfal.ia. Opel is an old German company dating from the 1860s that was bought by General Moto rs in 1929. Europeans consider Opel a German car and the region Jnd its workers generally look upon Opel as a GermJn company. Nevertheless, Opel is controlled from the American headquarters of General M o tors. Ford founded Ford Werke in 1925 and it is perhaps even more tightl y associated wi th its American founder. H owever, Ford Werke still represents a m aj or employer in Koln. (Dankbaar, 2) These companies are mass-market producers that have been criticized as too focus ed o n the American emphasis on productivity and cost cutting rather than the typical German automobile manufacturer's focus o n engineering, product innovatio n and quality. The reputation of the German auto industry for engineering has often allowed German manufacturers to obtain a premium for their cars that h as historically helped them to overcome the disadvantage of high cost production in Germany. The different bu siness cultures at Opel and Ford, as compared with the other German manufacturers, is refl ected in. less innovative product lines and a lower consumer image that has required Opel and Ford Werke to compete more o n price against the other European mass market manufacturers, and has resulted in lower profit margins or losses. A comparison b etween the net returns on 2004 sales between Opel, which had a net loss on sales of minus 4%, and the world auto industry leading net sales returns of Porsch e at plus 17%, illustrates the potential difference in added value afforded by image, although these two m anufacturers occupy very different market niches. (Becker, 4 and 10) 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER AND EXPANDING SCOPE AND COMPETITION IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY
DaimlerChrysler was created in 1998 as the result of a merger between the German company Daimler-Benz, which produces the Mercedes-Benz luxury brand, and the U.s. mass-m arket manufacturer, C hrysler, with the German m anagers in control of the new company. The German corporate culture of DaimlerC hrysler reflects the relative social and political conservatism of its home state of Baden-Wi.irttemburg, w here its headquarter city of Stuttga rt is located. (Dankbaar, 1) The m erger with C hrysler reflected an extension of Daimler-Benz down m arket that had already been started with the development of its Smart Car subsidiary in the late 1990s and the expansion of the Mercedes-Benz line to include the relatively inexpensive Mercedes A-class.
This product expansion reflects the competitive picture in the German auto industry in which the high-end manufacturers, such as Mercedes-Benz and BMW, try to poach sales and generate growth in the middle and lower segments of the nurket at the expense of the historic mass-market producers. At the sam e time, as we have noted , VW and other mass end market as a specialist producer rather than a volume producer. More recently, however, BMW has hedged its bets with a limited expansion into the nuss-market segment with the Mini Cooper car and the lower end BMW 1 series. BMW has also pursued an extension of its high-end market into the ultra luxury field with the acquisition of the Rolls-Royce brand.
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The Impact of EU Oversight on Corporate Governance in the German Auto Industry producers try to m ove into the high end of the m arket for growth and higher profit m argins . D aim..lerChrysler has also followed BMW's and VW's expansio ns into the ultra-luxury m arket. BMW and VW acquired the Rolls R oyce and Bentley brands, respectively. D aimlerC hrysler respo nded by developing its own new M aybach ultra-luxury brand . This situatio n of ever expanding m odel ranges is occurring world w ide in an auto industry replete with over capacity and stagnant real growth.
T he effo rts of relative niche pbyers like M erecedes-Benz and B MW to extend their m arket into the lower range, and the effo rts of the mass-producers, such as VW, to expand into the upper m arket segm ent, ha ve not addressed the industry's problem of over ca pacity. Instead, each m anu fac turer that has followed this ro ute fa ces the increased cost of m aintaining greater m odel diversity with lower than planned profit margins resulting from a glut of new m odels across all m arket segm ents that has led to increased price competition in each price range. Becker h as referred to this situatio n as an "oligopolistic destru ctive competitio n. As the m arket as a w hole is no lo nge r growing, every pro ducer is trying to generate growth at the cost of the other competitors .. .. the result in the end is that no ne can be the lucky w inner; to a greater or lesser degree they are all losers w ith stagnant market volumes and shrinking profit margins." (B ecker, 11 ) Maynard and B unkley qu oted a veteran auto industry amlyst, j ohn A. Casesa , in the N cUJ Y(,,·k T imcs as saying that, "This industry is ripe fo r further consolida tion beca use the m ost profit able markets have m atured; they 're not growing anym o re. T hese are classic conditions fo r consolidation."7
THE RISKS OF MERGING WITH A NON-GERMAN PARTNER
Although consolidation can clea rly b e a m ethod to redu ce overcapacity in the auto industry, this was not Daimler-Benz's intent when they m erged w ith C hrysler in 1998. Instead, they sought market expansio n and a possible increase in effi ciency thro ugh econo mies of scale. H owever, Daintier inherited an aging and relati vely weak product line in the acquired C hrysler brands and was faced with the investment and engineering ch allenge of coming up with competitive models for the four Chrysler brands, one of which they eliminated (Plym o uth) . The Daimler-Benz strategy of acquiring an expanded world lnarket share through its m erger with C hrysler is now seen as an apparent failure. Furtherm ore, the m erger that resulted in D aimlerC hrysler led to a relatively wide distributio n of corporate ownership, as compared to the narrow distribution of own ership and control typical of German companies, particularly in the German auto industry (excluding the American controlled companies of Opel and Fo rd). The D aintler-B e nz/ C hrysler m erger resulted in Americans holding 10% of the shares in the resulting DaimlerC hrysler Corpo ration. (Dankbaar, 1) T his brings into play an American shareholder expectati on of m aximizing sh are valu e.
SHAREHOLDERS VS. STAKEHOLDERS
American shareholder interest in maximizing share price over the sho rt term is at odds with the traditio nal German m entality of shareholders as company stakeh olders. German company shareholders and vo ting blocks are not w idely distributed among financial and other private institutio ns, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and individuals, as compared to the broad distribution of company stocks held by these fa ctions in America (o r in the u.K.). (Becht and M ayer, 29) Instead , German board and sh areholder voting blocks are m o re tightly held and include trade unio ns and banks with a 38 JASON GORN Pitzer College producers try to m ove into the high end of the m arket for growth and higher profit m argins . D aim..lerChrysler has also followed BMW's and VW's expansio ns into the ultra-luxury m arket. BMW and VW acquired the Rolls R oyce and Bentley brands, respectively. D aimlerC hrysler respo nded by developing its own new M aybach ultra-luxury brand . This situatio n of ever expanding m odel ranges is occurring world w ide in an auto industry replete with over capacity and stagnant real growth.
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American shareholder interest in maximizing share price over the sho rt term is at odds with the traditio nal German m entality of shareholders as company stakeh olders. German company shareholders and vo ting blocks are not w idely distributed among financial and other private institutio ns, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and individuals, as compared to the broad distribution of company stocks held by these fa ctions in America (o r in the u.K.). (Becht and M ayer, 29) Instead , German board and sh areholder voting blocks are m o re tightly held and include trade unio ns and banks with a http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/5 stake in the company, in addition to the holdings of founding families, other German companies, and, in some cases, the state. These German shareholders have a long-term stake in the companies that they hold and are typically categorized as risk adverse, interested in the long-term stability of the corporation, and are concerned with the social implications of risky organizational change. (Luo. 38)
THE RISKS Of SHAREHOLDERS: THE DAIMLERCHRVSLER EXAMPLE
The German auto companies have only Illediocre market capitalization levels, especially in comparison with Toyota, the world's most valuable carmaker with a market capitalization of 239 billion dollars.S This reflects the fact that, overall, Germany lacks a shareholder culture, with a market capitalization of only 30% of its GDp, compared to 122% in the U.S. and 152% in the u.K. Typically, individuals and institutional investors own few shares of German public corporations. (Luo, 42) If the present major stakeholders in the German auto companies lose control over their tightly held shares and limited voting blocks, "Acquisitions by outsiders could put Germany's automobile industry in the same position as Britain's. where every notable name has been sold to foreign owners."9
The vulnerability of DaimlerChrysler to such a takeover is perceived as having increased as the result of its swallowing of Chrysler and the resulting depreciation and dilution of its stock. This caIne to a head in February 2007 when the Chrysler division of DaiInlerChysler reported that it had lost 1.48 billion dollars . Dieter Zetsche , D<\imlerChrysler's chief executive, announced that "all options are on the After the potential sale of Chrysler, DaimlerChrysler shareholders have advoca ted a return to the "old days," with the resurrection of the D aimler-Benz name and a renewed emphasis on the Mercedes luxury brand 14 Presumably, this restructuring would allow a return to the previous concentration of shareholders who hold a stake in the company and a typical German corporate concentration of voting blocks that could fend off hostile takeovers in the future. Tllis potential effort by DaimlerChrysler to divest itself of its American corporate division is an effort to reassert its German roots and return to the typical protectionist German corporate influences of the past. stake in the company, in addition to the holdings of founding families, other German companies, and, in some cases, the state. These German shareholders have a long-term stake in the companies that they hold and are typically categorized as risk adverse, interested in the long-term stability of the corporation, and are concerned with the social implications of risky organizational change. (Luo. 38) 
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DAIMLER-BENZ: THE ROLE OF BANKS IN GERMAN CORPORATIONS
Prior to its merger with Chrysler, Daimler-Benz represented a classic example of German corporate structure. Corporate government at the former Daimler-Benz, like most Gennan corporations, was "characterized by a lesser reliance on capital markets and outside investo rs and a stronger reliance on large inside investors and finan cial institutions to achieve efilciency ... " (Luo, (Logue and Seward, 90) The supervisory board's task is to appoint the management board and to approve major corporate decisions. Much of this is left up to banks.
As Logue and Seward also point o ut, "This bank dominance effectively means that under the traditional system of corporate governance in Germany, external capital markets exert little discipline." (91) The proponents of this German system of stakeholder corporate governance, as opposed to shareholder corporate culture, argue that large shareholders like the banks share strategic motivations with the operational managers to advance the company's business rather than a motivation to merely maxinlize the value of a company's 40 JASON GORN Pitzer College
Prior to its merger with Chrysler, Daimler-Benz represented a classic example of German corporate structure. Corporate government at the former Daimler-Benz, like most Gennan corporations, was "characterized by a lesser reliance on capital markets and outside investo rs and a stronger reliance on large inside investors and finan cial institutions to achieve efilciency ... " (Luo, 42) Instead of m arket and outside investors, Germans firms receive strong investment from banks tlut are influential in the design and fun ctioning of the companies them selves. This is a result of the tact that the banks themselves sit on the boards and commissions of the companies. Ernst-Jiirgen Horn , in his evaluation of industrial policy in M'I/laging Illdustrial Change in J,#stcrn Europe, reports that the "banking system is said to have an extraordinarily intimate relationship with the big industrial groups .... Excessive economic power. ... allows the banks to act as brokers, investlnent analysts, dealers and much else besides." (55) Horn then goes on to list three major factors in bank control: "(i) Participation of banks in non bank corporations. (ii) The Depotstimmrecht, that is the proxy votes by banks on behalf of shares deposited with them by clients. (iii) The representation of banks on the supervisory boards of non bank operations." (55). Horn sites statistics that show how imbedded banks are in firms. For example, in the annual meeting of sixteen corporations, the bank-owned shares came to over 25 percent of shares represented in corporations. Banks also control proxy votes and represented through proxies over 25 percent of the votes in 41 corporations, and over 50 percent in thirty. This means that through proxies alone, not including bank owned shares, banks could vote on 10 percent of the shares in fifty cases, going as high as 25 percent in twenty-nine cases. (56) In "Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The Case of Daimler-Benz," Denis Logue and James K. Seward reported that in the late 1980's banks were the top 5 shareholders in the Daimler-Benz company, controlling 78.39 percent of the voting stock. (90) The structure of Daimler-Benz was a prime example of the typical German corporation. Deutsche Bank in particular has had deep and historic ties to Daimler-Benz, with links to both of its parent companies, Daintier and Benz. Deutsche Bank was heavily involved in the m erger of these two firms in 1926 and supplied the chairmanship of the newly merged company over its first decade. (Whittington and Myer, 97 ) Deutsche Bank's investment in Daimler-Benz in 1993 consisted of roughly 28 percent of the company's stock. As Logue and Seward explain, Deutsche Bank exerted incredible power in managing the company. Tllis has to do with the typical German corporate structure of the company. "Large German companies have two governing boards: the supervisory board and the management board. The supervisory board is composed of directors and representatives of various labor groups; including 'white collar' employees ... The supervisory board of Daimler-Benz has twenty members. The chairman of Daimler-Benz's supervisory board, Hilmar Kopper, also happens to be the chairman of Deutsch e Bank's management board." (Logue and Seward, 90) The supervisory board's task is to appoint the management board and to approve major corporate decisions. Much of this is left up to banks.
As Logue and Seward also point o ut, "This bank dominance effectively means that under the traditional system of corporate governance in Germany, external capital markets exert little discipline." (91) The proponents of this German system of stakeholder corporate governance, as opposed to shareholder corporate culture, argue that large shareholders like the banks share strategic motivations with the operational managers to advance the company's business rather than a motivation to merely maxinlize the value of a company's http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/5 shares. According to Sigurt Vitols, "Large German banks have tended to view their shareholdings as a mechanism for protecting their loans and strengthening their business relationships with companies rather than as a direct source of income." (Vitols, 342) Horn concludes, " It is hard to assess how far the close relationship between the banks and the big corporJtions contributes to overall industrial performance. It has been argued that the banks are well equipped to provide strategic advice and that, wanting good returns, they are vitally concerned with the efficiency of their clients." (56).
THE PRESSURES OF GLOBALIZATION ON GERMAN CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The argument agJinst the German stake holding system fits into the general views on globalization, which are increasingly being promoted by the European Union. The E.u.
seeks to promote actions that are in the interest of international competitiveness (as opposed to the potentially more myopic interests of corporate stakeholders) and in the interest of developing a single capital market. The E. U. policies, therefore, tend to encour;]ge corporate restructuring in "stakeholder countries" such as Germany. These policies are designed to Clcilitate takeover bids when such bids are in the interests of a company's general shareholders, as opposed to the interests of only its stakeholders. This E. U. policy ofhreaking down the protectionist barriers to takeovers has been contentious, as can be seen in the close votes in the European Parliament on provisions in the E.U. law (directive) concerning takeovers. For example, in July 2001 , 273 representatives voted for and 273 voted against a proposed directive text, which defea ted that effort. IS To a large degree, the E.u. efiorts have been "incremental-rather than fundamental " in advancing changes in ownership, employee representation, and management institutions. (Vitols, 339) Proponents of these changes argue that, "since international capital markets are increasingly dominated by diversified portfolio investors (such as mutual funds and pension funds) seeking higher returns, c~mpanies must adopt the shareholder model or be starved of the external capital needed to invest and survive." (Vitols, 338) According to this argument, obtaining access to capital markets will ultimately drive corporations away from the non-market driven features of the stakeholder model in order to achieve greater competitiveness.
The DaimlerChrysler merger took Daimler-Benz at least incrementally in the direction of market forces and incrementally away from its stakeholder foundations. DaimlerChrysler was incorporated under German law as a German stock corporation (A G) and retains a two-tiered German system of corporate governance with a supervisory board of major shareholder and employee representatives and a separate management board, all in keeping with the German stakeholder system. However, shares of DaimlerChrysler are widely held and company shares are traded on both the NYSE and the FrJnkfurt Stock Exchange, and at other locations around the world, with the necessary transparency in financial reporting. Americans are estimated to hold 10% or more of the stock. (Dankbaar, 1) Although Deutsche Bank remains the largest single shareholder, the bank's holding were diluted from 28% to 12% by the merger. (Whittington and Mayer, 97) When the going recently got rough, with Chrysler division losing 1.48 billion dollars and the world automotive industry ripe for further consolidation, even this incremental move by Daintier toward market/ shareholder forces, and the resulting dilution of the stakeholder system at Daintier, has been enough for DaimlerChrysler CEO Dieter Zetsche to adapt a cut and run policy toward Chrysler. By divesting the Chrysler division and the American shareholder pressures that came along with the Chrysler acquisition, Zetsche hopes to avoid putting the shares. According to Sigurt Vitols, "Large German banks have tended to view their shareholdings as a mechanism for protecting their loans and strengthening their business relationships with companies rather than as a direct source of income." (Vitols, 342) Horn concludes, " It is hard to assess how far the close relationship between the banks and the big corporJtions contributes to overall industrial performance. It has been argued that the banks are well equipped to provide strategic advice and that, wanting good returns, they are vitally concerned with the efficiency of their clients." (56).
The DaimlerChrysler merger took Daimler-Benz at least incrementally in the direction of market forces and incrementally away from its stakeholder foundations. DaimlerChrysler was incorporated under German law as a German stock corporation (A G) and retains a two-tiered German system of corporate governance with a supervisory board of major shareholder and employee representatives and a separate management board, all in keeping with the German stakeholder system. However, shares of DaimlerChrysler are widely held and company shares are traded on both the NYSE and the FrJnkfurt Stock Exchange, and at other locations around the world, with the necessary transparency in financial reporting. Americans are estimated to hold 10% or more of the stock. (Dankbaar, 1) Although Deutsche Bank remains the largest single shareholder, the bank's holding were diluted from 28% to 12% by the merger. (Whittington and Mayer, 97) When the going recently got rough, with Chrysler division losing 1.48 billion dollars and the world automotive industry ripe for further consolidation, even this incremental move by Daintier toward market/ shareholder forces, and the resulting dilution of the stakeholder system at Daintier, has been enough for DaimlerChrysler CEO Dieter Zetsche to adapt a cut and run policy toward Chrysler. By divesting the Chrysler division and the American shareholder pressures that came along with the Chrysler acquisition, Zetsche hopes to avoid putting the The Impact of EU Oversight on Corporate Governance in the German Auto Industry core G erman company in play fo r a takeover, with a little help from stakeholder promoting Gennan laws and German corpo rate governance institutio ns.
TAKEOVER FROM THE INSIDE: PORSCHE AND VW
DaimlerChrysler's takeover fears did not arise in a vacuum. D airnlerChrysler has been the observer ofPorsche 's partially hostile takeover of the mu ch large rVW Corporati on over the last 18 months. T his takeover raises still other concerns relating to co rporate globaliza tion-type reforms and E . U. policy, as well as potential conflict of interest concerns relating to cross investment in German companies, even by competitors in the sam e industry. It also points to a fl aw in the German system of concentrated corporate ownership and control, which m ay allow an inside player to w restle control of a company if German restraints against takeovers are relaxed. The Porsche takeover ofVW shows that, at least in the sh o rt term , German firms m ay have to be m o re concerned abo ut takeovers from with.in their b oarders than from o utside. The stereotypical xenophobic nature of the German psyche nuy care less ab o ut this threa t, but su ch inside takeovers are not necessarily in the general sh areholders interest, o r even in the interest of a particular corporation such as VW.
Although Porsch e has histo ric engineering and product ties to Vw, these ties have seem.in gly benefited the sm aller Po rsche Company to a greater degree. It is unlikely that Po rsch e would have been able to m anufacture automobiles witho ut access to VW parts from its very b eginning. As auto m akers look to expand the scope of their lines into new m odels in o rder to compete, the sm all European niche players other than Po rsche have all been absorbed by larger firms. T he writing is on the wall, even tho ugh Porsche remains highl y profitable in the present. As we have seen , Porsche's present profitabilit y was aided by the highl y advantageous deal that Porsche was able to make w ith VW to give it access to the To uareg SUV platform fo r its Cayenne version luxury SUVThis platform was developed at a to tal estimated cost of 1.2 to 1.8 billion dollars. Porsche invested only 420 million dollars, w hich is "very, very little fo r a n ew car," according to Ferdinand Dudenhoffer, directo r of the German C enter for Autom o tive Research at the University of Gelsenkirchen. "There is no question, VW had all the risks and Porsche earned the greatest profits," according to Dudenhoffer. 16 VW also does m ost of the m anufacturing of the C ayenne for Porsche at its factory in Bratislava, were the cost of m.anufacturing is lower than at existing Porsche plants in Germany. If Porsche's interests are allowed to dictate future developments, VW's own brands may suffer in Po rsche's interest, as the wide range of brands and models that VW owns nuy potentially, if no t alread y, compete with Porsche, particularly Audi. This conflict has, in fac t, already been dem onstrated in the Cayenne/ Touareg deal.This deal went through well b efore the present Po rsch e takeover effort, but it still likely reflects the strong position of Piech and other Po rsch e representatives on the VW advisory board, even before the takeove r. Audi insiders complain that the VW I Porsche cooperation on the Cayenne delayed the introduction of the Audi Q7 luxury SUV by 3 years. Tlus car has only just recently com e to m arket, well after the Cayenne, likely costing Audi m arket share and profit. Other VW brands besides Audi m ay also stand in the way of Po rsche's current or potential m arket nich e, particularly Bugatti and Lambo rgini. Will the fat e of these brands be deternuned by VW's b est interest or in the best interest ofPorsche?17
CROSS OWNERSHIP OF CORPORATE SHARES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
These m arket concerns are no t simply details of the German auto market; they arise 42 JASON GORN Pitzer College core G erman company in play fo r a takeover, with a little help from stakeholder promoting Gennan laws and German corpo rate governance institutio ns.
TAKEOVER FROM THE INSIDE: PORSCHE AND VW
CROSS OWNERSHIP OF CORPORATE SHARES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
These m arket concerns are no t simply details of the German auto market; they arise http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/5 from a potential conflict of interest inherent in the German corporate governance structure that allows cross ownership in a competitor's company. This conflict of interest is potentially magnified by the concentrated ownership of controlling shares in German companies and it is spotlighted by Porsche's bid for VW In the case ofVW, the VW law served to counter the possibility that the owner of another company in the sa m e industry could amass a controlling stake that would allow him to influence management to act against the interests of the company, and therefore against the interest of Lower Saxony. Tllis law guaranteed Lower Saxo ny the single largest voting block of shares, which no other single owner could exceed. Even so, Ferdinand Piech, who with his family controls 100% of the voting shares of Porsche, was likely able to influence VW in the interests of Porsche even before he attempted his takeover ofVW. Piech's pre-existing power on the VW supervisory board certainl y helped llim to launch and pull off Porsche's takeover ofVW from the inside.
In the future, globalization and an accompanying shareholder culture may apply pressure for reforms to the German corporate culture that allows for co ncentrated cross ownership of stock in a competitor, such as the shares and influence exercised by Po rsche in VW Such influence is potentially counter to the interests of a free market and to the interests of company's general shareholders if the competitor gains undue influence in the company, as may have happened in the case ofPorsche and its influence on vw. Even before the Porsche/ VW takeover bid there had already been some press ure to change the German corporate practice of allowing a retired former CEO to ass ume the company 's board chairmanship, where he may appoint his successor and maintain undue influence. (Luo, 43) This practice was still in place at VW and it is one of the German corporate pra ctices that Piech exploited in his takeover ofVW. Piech holds the strong position of C hairman ofVW's supervisory board because he was the recently retired CEO ofVW Piech 's power was also magnified because he already controlled a large number of voting shares through the holdings of Porsche and his family in VW Porsche AG already held two seats on the VW supervisory board, in addition to Piech's own seat, even before the takeover attempt was launched. At the start of the Porsche and Piech takeover bid, " Investors, analysts, and members of the VW supervisory board [cried] foul over Piech's conflict of interest, since he juggles ownership in Porsche with his role as VW chairman." 18
THE PALACE Coup: HEADS ROLL
Christian Wulff, the premier of Lower Saxony who sits on the VW board representing the state of Lower Saxony, initially attempted to block Piech 's takeover by proposing that both Piech and the other Porsche managers who sit on the VW board be removed. He supported this proposal by citing the German corporate governance code that reconunends (hut does not demand) that a chairman step down if he holds a position with a conl.petitor. 19 This did not happen . The CEO ofVw, Bernd Pischetsrieder, sided with Wulff. Piech and his collaborators on the VW board removed Pischetsrieder in November 2006. 20 Piech stayed on, increasing Porsche's shares in VW and demanding an additional Porsche seat on the supervisory board. When Pischetsrieder was forced out as CEO, Volkswagen's No.2 executive, Wolfgang Bernhard, also resigned. Bernhard had been brought to VW from Chrysler to pursue a stringent cost-cutting program at VW to help better position VW as a competitive mass-market producer. With the removal of these two executives and the appointment of Martin Winterkorn, a Piech protege, Piech consolidated his hold on VW and reasserted VW's old priorities from his tenure as CEO at vw. Since these management
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THE PALACE Coup: HEADS ROLL
The Impact of EU Oversight on Corporate Governance in the German Auto Industry changes,VW has shifted its emphasis from cost-cutting back to high-quality engineering and design, in line with the market strategy advocated by Mr. Piech, who trained as an automotive engineer. 21 Only the VW law could conceivably stand in the way of Piech's and Porsche's takeover ofVW, a takeover which reassembles the parts of Piech's grandfather's automotive legacy into one empire.
THE E.U.'s UPHILL BATTLE TO FACILITATE TAKEOVERS
Piech's takeover bid was always dependent on the E.U striking down the German VW law. Piech had reason to believe that the E.U would comply with his wishes. The E.U Parliament has long recognized that a directive on a common framework for cross-boarder takeover bids is essential. Under increasing conditions of globalization, such transactions "can contribute to the development and reorganization of European firms, a key condition for withstanding international competition and developing a single capital market. That said, [takeovers] are still subject to very divergent national rules [that] give rise to numerous problems ... " (COM (2002) 534 final, page 3)
The contentiousness of this takeover issue can be seen in the E.Ulegislative history involving the framing of a directive on takeover bids. The E.U. first began work on a directive to approximate E .U member state's laws that govern takeover bids in 1985. By 1990, the E.U Commission had devised the text of a directive aimed at " harmonizing" the field of takeover bids in Europe. This proposal encountered strong opposition from certain member states and required revision. (COM (2002) 534 final, page, 2) By 1997, however, the Commission adapted an amended proposal and by 2000 the Council unanimously adopted this position. Controversies on certain issues persisted and amendments were proposed. The tie vote in the European Parliament on a compromise text, mentioned above, led to the defeat of the text in July 2001. This defeat centered on three controversial political considerations that reflect Europe's ambivalence on takeovers. The first political consideration was a rejection of the stipulation that the board of a company facing a takeover must obtain approval from shareholders before it can take defensive measures against a bid. The second political consideration was the perception that the E.U. takeover directive provided insufficient protection to the employees of companies facing a takeover. The third political concern was that the proposal still failed to achieve a level playing field with the United States. (COM (2002) 534 final, page 2) Despite the existence of an E.U law to facilitate takeovers, political divisions such as these have continued to hamstring the E.U's efforts.
In 2002, the European Conunission proposed new rules to address outstanding concerns on the takeover directive. This new revision contained articles that had specific implications against the survival of the German VW law, or similar measures. Specifically, Article 11 of these provisions stipulates that restrictions on the transfer of securities, such as the imposition of a ceiling on shareholding or restrictions on voting rights, "are rendered unenforceable against the ofieror or cease to have effect once a bid has been made public (Article 11)." (COM (2002) 534 final, page 4) These provisions, and other provisions designed to prevent both pre-bid and post-bid defenses to takeovers, were adapted in the Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of21 April 2004 on takeover bids. However, last minute negotiations at the time, resulting from strong resistance on the part of several countries, including Germany, heavily watered down this E.U takeover directive. These negotiations resulted in an amendment that allows countries to 44 JASON GORN Pitzer College changes,VW has shifted its emphasis from cost-cutting back to high-quality engineering and design, in line with the market strategy advocated by Mr. Piech, who trained as an automotive engineer. 21 Only the VW law could conceivably stand in the way of Piech's and Porsche's takeover ofVW, a takeover which reassembles the parts of Piech's grandfather's automotive legacy into one empire.
In 2002, the European Conunission proposed new rules to address outstanding concerns on the takeover directive. This new revision contained articles that had specific implications against the survival of the German VW law, or similar measures. Specifically, Article 11 of these provisions stipulates that restrictions on the transfer of securities, such as the imposition of a ceiling on shareholding or restrictions on voting rights, "are rendered unenforceable against the ofieror or cease to have effect once a bid has been made public (Article 11)." (COM (2002) 534 final, page 4) These provisions, and other provisions designed to prevent both pre-bid and post-bid defenses to takeovers, were adapted in the Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of21 April 2004 on takeover bids. However, last minute negotiations at the time, resulting from strong resistance on the part of several countries, including Germany, heavily watered down this E.U takeover directive. These negotiations resulted in an amendment that allows countries to http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/5 opt-out of certain key provisions of the directive. This amendment also exempts companies from the rules if the bidder is not subj ect to the same obliga tions. 
THE E.U. MOVES TO STRIKE DOWN THE VW LAW
Altho ugh many countri es, including Germany, exploited the loophole of optional exemptions to block the E. U. directive o n takeovers, the E . U. nevertheless proceeded to take legal action against countries that refused to apply the fundamental rules. The German Volkswagen law soon cam e under scrutiny by the E uropean Commissio n, which complained to Germany about the law in 2004 . 23 The E. U. su bsequentl y took Germany to court over this law in 2005. Porsch e and Piech's takeover bid forVW has, therefore, assumed that this law would b e struck down. A Porsche spokesman recentl y confirmed this assumption when he claimed " that the E uropean Court of Justice would confirm the invalidi ty of the VW la w and so ca use the German goverrunent to change or abolish tlus law."24 Porsche's assumptio n appears to have been correct. On February 13, 2007 , an advocate general on the E uro pean Court of Justice, Damaso Ruiz-Jarabo, reached a preliminary ruling stating that the VW law unreasonably prevented any intervention in the managem ent ofVW and was "not based o n overriding reasons relating to public interest."25 Although the advocate 's opinions are no t binding on E .U. judges, the court follow s these opinions approximately 80% of the time. 26 Should the court ta il to strike dow n the VW law, or should Ge rmany try to circumvent the authority of the court (perhaps through appeals invoking the opt-out provisions of the directive), Porsche will " find itself holding a costly stake in the company witho ut being able to exercise m o re than 20% of the voting shares."27
THE PORSCHE TAKEOVER OF VW: A FATE COMPUS
Since this anno uncem ent by the European Court advocate general , Porsche expanded its h oldings in VW to 31 % of the voting rights. T his acquisition exceeded the stipulated greater than 30% holding required to trigger a mandatory bid for the entire company. This stipulated m andatory bid for the entire company is the result of Article 5 of the E.U. takeover directive that sought to protect nunority share holders and guara ntee them an equitable price. However, tllis provisio n does not stipulate that the buyo ut offer be at a buyout induced prenuu111 share price, o r even at current market valu e, o nly that the offer be made at the stock's ave rage value over a period of at least 6 months, to be deternuned by German law. (2004/25 /EC: Article 5, section 4) Since Germany opted out of the directive rule that would have obliged the VW board to hold a general meeting of shareholders to vote to approve or block the bid, the general (non-voting) shareholders in VW have no power over the bid price offer other than that stipulated by the German implementatio n of Article 5 of the E . U. takeover directive. This meant that Porsche was able to make a below market offer to buy the rel1l.aining shares in the company. Porsche and Piech's inside influence allowed Porsche to gain control ofVW at a relative bargain price without paying opt-out of certain key provisions of the directive. This amendment also exempts companies from the rules if the bidder is not subj ect to the same obliga tions. 22 A recent review by the Commission of the European Conm1Unities on the impl em entation of the Directive on Takeover bids, released o n February 21,2007, found that a majority of states exploited these loopholes in a protectionist fashion , which m ay have resulted in new obstacles to takeovers. (SEC(2007)268 , page 10) This report no tes that Gerlllany is one of many countries that allow its companies to o pt o ut of the two key provisions in the takeover directive, including the ilnpo rtant Article 11 (breakthrough rule) as well as Article 9 (the board neutrality rule). (SEC(2007) 268, page 12) For the time being, the German VW law remains on the books.
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THE PORSCHE TAKEOVER OF VW: A FATE COMPUS
Since this anno uncem ent by the European Court advocate general , Porsche expanded its h oldings in VW to 31 % of the voting rights. T his acquisition exceeded the stipulated greater than 30% holding required to trigger a mandatory bid for the entire company. This stipulated m andatory bid for the entire company is the result of Article 5 of the E.U. takeover directive that sought to protect nunority share holders and guara ntee them an equitable price. However, tllis provisio n does not stipulate that the buyo ut offer be at a buyout induced prenuu111 share price, o r even at current market valu e, o nly that the offer be made at the stock's ave rage value over a period of at least 6 months, to be deternuned by German law. (2004/25 /EC: Article 5, section 4) Since Germany opted out of the directive rule that would have obliged the VW board to hold a general meeting of shareholders to vote to approve or block the bid, the general (non-voting) shareholders in VW have no power over the bid price offer other than that stipulated by the German implementatio n of Article 5 of the E . U. takeover directive. This meant that Porsche was able to make a below market offer to buy the rel1l.aining shares in the company. Porsche and Piech's inside influence allowed Porsche to gain control ofVW at a relative bargain price without paying
The Impact of EU Oversight on Corporate Governance in the German Auto Industry shareholders the typical premium that a takeover entails. M ajor VW shareholders are reportedly distressed at this result. 28 Since Porsche now already controls the company with 31 % of the voting shares, it does not need the remaining company shares, most of which exert no influence on how the company is run. Porsche's below market bid for these shares is only a formality. Porsche is not likely to have to buy any shares at the offered price, whi ch is well below the current market-trading price. This is fin e with Porsche, which does not plan to further increase its shares, according to a Porsche spokesman. 29 Porsche and Piech, therefore, gained control ofVW "on the cheap," and the E. U. takeover directive stipulation (Article 5) designed to protect the share price for minority shareholders was inefiective in this case.
Politically, Porsche has had to convince the Germans that it is a stable partner acting in the interests ofVW and of Germany, emphasizing that Porsche is not an outside (foreign) interloper. Porsche and Piech's public relations program in tlus vein seeks to paint Porsche as the savior ofVW, with Porsche acting to protect VW from the consequences of the E. U. court's impending decision to strike-down the VW law. Porsche's campaign insinuates that if Porsche does not gain control oNW, the elinunation of the VW law will result Volkswagen being acquired by an outside buyer who would insist on American style restructuring with the loss of thousands of jobs. Adam Jonas, the auto industry analyst at Morgan Stanley in London, interprets Porsche executives as saying, "Trust us, we're not trying to Hip this thing for value. This is a hundred year investment. Leave it with us, and we'll watch out for it."30
CONCLUSION
The German fear of takeovers in its auto industry is understandable given the vital importance of the auto industry to the German economy. The example of the British auto industry, in w luch every significant British-owned manufacturer succumbed to foreign takeover, is certainly prescient to the German auto industry and Governmant. The English car brands were often bought strictly for their marketing cach e, to be resurrected in another country without any British ties or contribution to the British economy, as exemplified by a Chinese lTlanufacturer who now manufactures a Chinese sports car under the MG nameplate. Germany is not alone in its resistance to lift barriers to takeovers. The E.U.'s own recent conmllssion report (SE(2007) 268) concluded that a large number of countries have failed to act to lift barriers against corporate takeovers through laws that would change protectionist corporate governance policies, as stipulated by the E.U. directive on corporate takeovers. Instead, there has been a strong trend for corporations and countries to use loopholes in the E.U takeover directive to find acceptable ways to block takeovers instead of facilitating them. This threatens to convert the existing E.U directive into a directive on allowed protectiOlust practices.
Striking down the VW law only removes one solitary law among the numerous institutionalized German corporate protections. Ironically, the Germ.an VW law had already outlived its usefulness. The law stood in the way of market forces that pushed two German companies to effectively consolidJte into one holding. This consolidation of VW and Porsche serves the needs ofPorsche, one of the most profitable German auto manufacturers, and may perpetuate German ownership ofVW in the long haui. However, the E. 0. system of creating a single free market by directive, including facilitation of corporate takeovers, has been exposed as weak. Although German stakeholder corporate governance and GermJn corporatist state policies and regulations are at odds with the market integration efforts by 46 JASON GORN Pitzer College shareholders the typical premium that a takeover entails. M ajor VW shareholders are reportedly distressed at this result. 28 Since Porsche now already controls the company with 31 % of the voting shares, it does not need the remaining company shares, most of which exert no influence on how the company is run. Porsche's below market bid for these shares is only a formality. Porsche is not likely to have to buy any shares at the offered price, whi ch is well below the current market-trading price. This is fin e with Porsche, which does not plan to further increase its shares, according to a Porsche spokesman. 29 Porsche and Piech, therefore, gained control ofVW "on the cheap," and the E. U. takeover directive stipulation (Article 5) designed to protect the share price for minority shareholders was inefiective in this case.
Striking down the VW law only removes one solitary law among the numerous institutionalized German corporate protections. Ironically, the Germ.an VW law had already outlived its usefulness. The law stood in the way of market forces that pushed two German companies to effectively consolidJte into one holding. This consolidation of VW and Porsche serves the needs ofPorsche, one of the most profitable German auto manufacturers, and may perpetuate German ownership ofVW in the long haui. However, the E. 0. system of creating a single free market by directive, including facilitation of corporate takeovers, has been exposed as weak. Although German stakeholder corporate governance and GermJn corporatist state policies and regulations are at odds with the market integration efforts by http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/5 the E.U, German corporatist policies will not go away as long as they are useful and are perceived as strengthening German commerce. If market forces subsequently prove that these policies are detrimental to German corporate and state interests, as globalists predict, then the Germans will change these policies. If market forces do not prove German stakeholder protectionist policies to be detrimental, particularly given their longstanding proven stability benefits, then these policies will persist.
The E.U. must let the market dictate, as E. U. directives will not dictate the market. The European Commission, in its report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids (SE(2007)268) has concluded as much when it announced that the E . U will take no immediate efforts to rewrite the directive to achieve better implementation of its objectives. Instead, the Commission plans to take "into account the potential negative effects of the new takeover rules on the European market. ... and try to analyze the reasons why Member States are so reluctant to endorse the fundamental rules of the Directive." (SE (2007)268) In other words, the COlnmission will continue to observe German (and other European) corporate systems, including the German auto industry, but it will 'leave welJ enough alone,' at least for now.
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